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Integers, integrants and normative vectors:  
The limitations of  environmental policy integration 
under neoliberalism
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Abstract. Policy integration is a processes by which a particular policy, and the objectives, 
principles and values on which it is based, is intentionally integrated into a whole – a 
broader and more holistic set of  policies – where the former did not previously exist. 
We may call this whole the integer, a term used in mathematics for a whole number. The 
integer denotes the broader set of  policies of  a polity or political system and the set of  
instruments used to promote and implement these policies. We may call that which is to 
be integrated the integrant, a term used to denote a part of  a whole. The integrant may be 
defined as a particular policy and the set of  instruments used to promote and implement 
that policy which, it is intended, should be integrated into an integer. So environmental 
policy integration is a policy process to integrate a stipulated integrant (an environmental 
policy) throughout an integer (a broader set of  policies). Environmental policy integration 
is first and foremost a normative enterprise that seeks to shift the normative vector (the 
overall normative ‘pull’) of  the integer on to a more sustainable basis. However, the extent 
to which environmental policy integration can be successful in doing this is limited when 
integrants are shaped and influenced ab initio by the principles and values of  the integer. 
The paper argues that contemporary environmental policies are dominated primarily by 
neoliberal principles. The result is that while environmental policy integration has achieved 
some limited successes it is an essentially reformist approach that takes as its point of  
departure mainstream policies that routinely degrade the environment.
Keywords: integer, integrant, integral change, integration, participation, normative 
vector
Introduction
Environmental policy integration (EPI) may be defined as the aspiration and intention of 
integrating environmental aims and objectives throughout all policy sectors. Environmental 
policy should thus be seen not as an isolated policy sector but as something common to all 
sectors. Advocates for EPI include environmental ministries, citizens groups, conservation 
organisations (for example, World Wide Fund for Nature, 2013) and the secretariats of 
international environmental organisations. EPI is a major environmental policy paradigm, 
particularly in Europe (for example, Dupont and Oberthür, 2012; European Environment 
Agency, 2005; Hertin and Berkhout, 2010; Jordan and Lenschow, 2008; Lenschow, 2002).
The paper proceeds from the normative basis that environmental policy scholars and 
analysts should contribute constructively to debates on how a transition to environmental 
sustainability (however so defined) may be achieved. This enterprise should include the 
generation of new conceptions of policy and, where necessary, a critique of contemporary 
policy-making processes. To that end, the paper first presents a new conceptual imagination 
of EPI. It then examine the role of integration using forest policy as an example before 
considering the constraints to a more systemic integration of environmental policy in the 
broader structures of global governance. The role of participation in policy making is 
critically interrogated. The central argument of the paper is that EPI is often ineffective as 
it is rarely the major policy priority in broader policy systems. The objective of EPI, it is 
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argued, should be a major restructuring of policy in which environmental norms prevail. But 
while EPI often leads to positive incremental change, it fails to address the underlying causes 
of environmental degradation. The empirical focus of the paper is international forest policy, 
with particular reference to the United Nations and the Forest Stewardship Council. The 
paper concludes by examining the case for a World Environment Organisation.
An analytical framework for EPI
When analysing policy integration, we may ask what is being integrated and what it is being 
integrated into (Persson, 2007). Policy integration may be imagined as the processes by which 
some policies, and the objectives, principles and values on which the policies are based, are 
integrated into a whole, that is a broader and more holistic set of policies, where the former did 
not previously exist. We may call this whole the integer, a term that is used in mathematics to 
denote a whole number. The integer may be defined as the broader set of policies of a polity 
or political system and the set of instruments (legislation, regulation, subsidies, taxes, etc.) 
used to promote and implement these policies. We may call that which is to be integrated 
the integrant, a term that is used to denote a part of a whole. The integrant may be defined 
as a particular policy and the set of instruments used to promote and implement that policy 
which, it is intended, should be integrated into an integer. So EPI is a process intended to 
integrate a stipulated integrant (an environmental policy) throughout an integer (a broader 
set of policies).
Under this schema, both the integrant and integer are policy outputs and the policy 
instruments used to promote them. An integer may be conceived relatively narrowly (for 
example, as sectoral policies within a particular region) or more broadly (the sum totality of the 
policies generated by a particular polity, such as a local authority, country or intergovernmental 
organisation). Integrant and integer are not defined as a policy system or structure of governance, 
or the actors that comprise and contest policy systems and governance structures. Clearly, 
however, the policies generated by any system or structure depend in very large measure 
on the actors involved, the distribution of power between them and the processes used 
to generate and implement policy. The study of EPI thus requires a focus not only on integrants 
and integers as policy outputs; it necessarily requires analysis of the processes by which 
the one is integrated into the other, how they relate – or should relate – to each other and 
any trade-offs and compromises that actors make during the integration process.
The intention of EPI is never merely additive, so that the result of integrating integrant i 
into integer I can be expressed, say, as i + I. Neither is the intention that environmental policy 
will exist in isolation from other policies, with the integrant a bounded sub-set of the integer. 
The strategy of EPI is never to add environmental policy in ‘bolt on’ fashion; it is, rather, 
to affect some kind of qualitative change to the integer that would not have taken place in 
the absence of integration. That is, the integer post-integration is fundamentally redefined, 
with the integrant now integral to, and constituent of, a new broader universe of policy. The 
intention of integration, therefore, is a significant reorientation of policy that generates a 
qualitatively different policy integrity.
In this respect, the integrant may be compared to a catalyst in a chemical reaction, 
promoting change and a new chemical output without being consumed by the reaction itself. 
However, the analogy can only be carried so far: not only should the process of integration 
change the integer in line with environmental norms (which from an environmental 
standpoint is desirable), but some change to the integrant may also take place. An integrant 
may not arrive within an integer intact, in pure form; some changes to the environmental 
policy being integrated may be unavoidable due to political bargaining and compromise 
so that the intended integrant is weakened (which from an environmental standpoint is 
undesirable).
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EPI, therefore, is a complex and multifaceted process. Attempts at EPI may target integers 
at a range of spatial scales, such as the local, regional, country and global levels. But because 
what happens at one scale or in one policy domain may impact upon others integration may 
encompass both horizontal integration and vertical processes (Lafferty and Hovden, 2003; 
Lewanski, 2002; Watson et al., 2008). Horizontal integration refers to integration between 
sectors. An application of horizontal EPI to forests would be the integration of forest 
conservation norms into other sectors, such as transport, agriculture or urbanisation. The 
direct and indirect causes of deforestation and forest degradation are often found in other 
sectors; hence, the widespread recognition that deforestation cannot be arrested by forest 
policies alone and an holistic, integrated policy system is necessary. Here forest policy is the 
integrant and the broader policy set is the integer, with the intention being that integration 
will eliminate or arrest any negative feedbacks that policies within other sectors bring to bear 
upon the forest issue area. The intention of EPI is thus to generate policies that will impact 
not only on social systems but, more crucially, on ecological systems too.
Vertical integration is integration across scales and the often complex interconnections 
between different levels of governance. The proximity of an actor to a particular geographical 
space is not a reliable guide to the influence of that actor in that space. Actors who may never 
have visited a space may have a direct bearing on decisions taken on resource use within it. 
Similarly, actors at the local level may have certain value-based preferences on how local 
resources should be used only to find that they cannot achieve their desired outcomes as they 
have less influence than other more powerful actors operating at considerable remove from 
the space in question, such as central government, investment banks and forest businesses. 
Bruno Latour (1987) has coined the term ‘action at a distance’ to describe the phenomenon 
whereby actors can exercise agency in spaces they have not visited and may not even have 
heard of (Preston, 2006).
So if a set of local actors has one desired policy enterprise, say the conservation of a local 
forest, they may set out to achieve this through a variety of approaches, such as restoration 
and conservation work within the forest. They may seek to influence other actors whose 
behaviours and policies may lead to the degradation of the forest. But this may be insufficient 
to achieve the desired results: the various decisions taken at all levels may combine to produce 
localised spatial effects which, from an environmental standpoint, are undesirable. Because 
some actors may exercise action at a distance, actors seeking to conserve a local forest 
may seek to lobby and influence actors in other localities, both in other sectors (horizontal 
integration) and other scales (vertical integration). So an effective conservation initiative at a 
local level, such as a village or municipality, may require not only the coalition of local actors 
around a particular policy enterprise; it may also require influencing those actors whose 
policies or behaviours, intentionally or otherwise, generate environmental degradation.
However, these other actors have their own goal-oriented objectives. While some actors 
may seek to conserve an area of forest, others may have very different designs: a transport 
ministry may wish the forest to be levelled for a motorway bypass while an agricultural 
corporation or urban development consortium may wish to convert it to an alternative land use. 
These actors too may also engage in policy integration, seeking to promote and integrate their 
policies into other sectors. In this respect, we may talk of, say, transport policy integration or 
urban policy integration promoted by those for whom forestry and environmental norms may 
represent barriers to desired outcomes. These actors may actively resist EPI. In short, there 
is no single integrating enterprise, and in this respect, environmental policy is not unique. 
There are, rather, different attempts to integrate different values, ideas and principles from 
one policy area to another. Policy integration, therefore, is not only a normative endeavour. 
With different integrating initiatives emanating from different policy quarters, the question 
then becomes, whose norms should prevail. This is unavoidably a political question.
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Policy integration: A political question
Within any given integer, there are a wide range of policies, some of which may require 
little, if any, behavioural change from actors, while others may be broad overarching policies 
that impact upon most actors in a particular policy domain. Different policies may promote 
different, possibly competing, norms, but not all policies are equal in terms of how they 
shape behaviour. In order to assess how feasible EPI may be as a strategy at a given time 
and for a given space, it makes sense to consider the overall behavioural ‘pull’ of the target 
integer. We may refer to this behavioural pull as the normative vector. A normative vector 
may be envisaged as a conceptual aggregate, the overall direction in which an integer directs 
actors’ behaviour once the many different policies that constitute it, some of which may pull 
in different directions and thus cancel each other out, have been totalled. It is conceptually 
similar to the vector of a physical body that is subjected simultaneously to many forces of 
varying strengths from different directions. The concept of a vector thus encompasses two 
things: direction and magnitude. The notion of a normative vector thus denotes the overall 
normative direction of an integer and the extent to which policies are binding and enforced.
For example, and by way of illustration, if the level of analysis is country level, then 
within any given country some policy objectives (e.g. promoting full employment, cutting the 
public deficit, reducing inflation, fighting terrorism) may dominate the political landscape at 
some times but not others. A dominant policy objective will never be the only objective; there 
will always be others, some of which may inhibit or conflict with the dominant objective. The 
overall normative vector will depend on certain variables, such as any persistent problems 
the country faces, the ideology of the governing party, the broader international context at 
the time and pressure from constituents and external actors (such as the IMF, international 
banks and so on). A governing party will inherit legislative, regulatory and fiscal instruments 
from their predecessors which will provide a certain path dependence to policy. They will 
retain some policies, overturn others and introduce new policies. So at any one time, the 
normative vector of an integer is the product of the historical and current priorities of those 
actors that wield political power in the policy process and the discourses and ideologies these 
actors used to promote, support and legitimise their policies. The normative vector of the 
target integer will play an important role in determining how successful the integration of 
environmental policy is likely to be.
We may distinguish between two ideal type relationships between integrant and integer. 
The first is normative congruence: a situation where the norms of the integrant are congruent 
with the normative vector of the integer, so that realising the objectives of the former 
enhances, or at least does not inhibit, the realisation of the objectives of the latter. In such a 
situation, we can expect the integer to be receptive to, or at least not resistant to, the integrant. 
The second relationship is one of normative incongruence a situation where the norms of the 
integrant collide with the normative vector of the integer, so that realising the objectives of 
the one will necessarily impede the realisation of the other. In such a situation, we can expect 
the integer to be resistant to the integrant.
Clearly EPI is most like to succeed where the integrant–integer relationship is one of 
congruence rather than incongruence. A simplified example: let us suppose that the dominant 
norm of a set of policies (the integer) is forest conservation, and that the norm of the policy 
to be integrated (the integrant) is bird conservation. As many birds live in forests, measures 
to conserve the one will also serve to conserve the other. This is a case of normative 
congruence. However, if the dominant norm of the integer is short-term maximisation of 
timber yields and that of the integrant was long-term forest conservation, then a state of 
normative incongruence would exist. Effective policy integration will be difficult as actors 
supporting the normative vector can be expected actively to resist integration. As ideal types, 
the categories of normative congruence and incongruence may be seen as two poles on a 
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continuum between which there is an intermediate area where neither outright congruence 
nor incongruence exists.
Much depends on the details of the policies of integrant and integer. There is no single 
environmental policy, rather many different potential policies that vary significantly in terms 
of values, objectives, winners and losers. The details of forest policy may vary considerably. 
Deep green ecologists (Naess, 1989) or strong preservationists may argue that environmental 
norms should always prevail and should not be bargained down and diluted through political 
bargaining with other interests. On this view, any forest-based policy should be guided only 
by the imperative of conserving forests.
Some degree of normative incongruence would arise if an attempt was made to integrate 
an environmental policy integrant based on deep green norms into an integer where 
dominant policy norms allow some conversion of forests to alternative land uses. Normative 
incongruence may still occur, but is less likely to do so, when EPI is driven by weaker 
norms, such as a more ‘light’ green perspective whereby trade-offs between economic and 
developmental objectives on the one hand and environmental objectives on the other are 
considered acceptable. So the different norms of the integrant and the integer are central 
in determining whether normative incongruence is likely and, therefore, how effective EPI 
will be.
The intention of EPI is to move from fragmented and disconnected policy making 
towards a qualitatively different policy system focused on the pursuit of environmental 
norms. Even where normative incongruence is not inevitable, conflict between actors may 
arise over the fine-grained details. For example, there are many different ways in which 
any given policy may be implemented. Who, then, has the power to implement their vision 
of EPI? Should EPI be driven by local communities, by national government or through 
other more deliberative processes? To what extent are trade-offs acceptable between 
environmental and non-environmental objectives? Actors who may stand to win from EPI, 
or who believe it to be morally right, will support EPI, but we may posit that such actors 
are usually in the minority or relatively powerless: were it otherwise then we would expect 
environmental policies already to be the dominant force guiding the normative vector of 
the integer.
Proponents of EPI thus begin from a position of structural weakness, a position that may be 
difficult to reverse as actors who perceive they may lose from EPI will resist integration. One 
factor that determines whether EPI is likely to be successful in meeting its stated objectives 
is the power of the proponents of the environmental policy relative to rival policies. Powerful 
actors may prevent the adoption of environmental policy. Even if they cannot they may be 
able to contest the details of policy implementation, impeding effective integration throughout 
the integer, with the result that the environmental policy fails to achieve the required change 
of direction of the normative vector and instead becomes a symbolic and isolated policy with 
little or no independent normative pull.
Indeed, it is precisely because powerful actors in business have the ability to resist 
and thwart environmental policy that the promotion of environmental objectives continues 
to be framed as one of integration (Falkner, 2008). A frequently used synonym in the 
environmental policy literature is ‘mainstreaming’ (for example, Wellstead et al., 2014) 
a term that denotes that environmental policy is not a central concern of government and 
other actors but that it should become so through integration into macroeconomic policies, 
investment and economic development. Because environmental policy, nature conservation 
and sustainability have historically been incongruent with the normative vectors of most 
policy systems those actors who promote conservationist norms have come to promote their 
objectives in terms of integration into sectors that attract more government funding and are 
supported by more powerful political interests, such as industry, agriculture and transport. 
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And those actors who benefit from these sectors generate the broader policy context through 
which those promoting environmental norms must seek to work in order to achieve EPI.
As with all generalisations there are exceptions, and this generalisation does not hold 
true for every geographical space. EPI can be successful and may lead, for example, to the 
creation of protected areas. The creation of a protected area creates, both geographically and 
metaphorically, a new policy space. Within this space, the dominant objectives will be, say, 
conservation, sustainable management, enhancement of biodiversity, and related objectives. 
Within the boundaries of the protected area, the normative vector is defined by conservationist 
norms with other policy objectives secondary. Those sectors that seek to promote alternative 
land uses – for example, the construction of a motorway or a high speed rail link – would, in 
effect, be seeking to promote a non-environmental integrant into an environmental integer.
Yet except when talking of global governance in its very broadest sense (a subject that is 
considered below), no policy system exists in isolation; different integers may be interconnected 
through horizontal and vertical processes. Within the boundaries of the protected area, one 
policy system and one dominant authority may apply, yet outside it protected area policy 
is situated within the broader integer of national socioeconomic policy. So protected areas 
continue to be politically contentious spaces, contested by actors whose objectives are not 
necessarily driven by environmental values (Brockington et al., 2008; Child, 2004). Again 
it is apparent that the proponents of environmental policy have no monopoly on integration; 
rather there are many, often conflicting, integrating enterprises. This point is developed later 
in the section ‘EPI, international forest policy and neoliberalism’. First, however, attention 
turns to a subject that is increasingly central to debates on EPI; participation. This subject is 
discussed with reference to forest policy.
Participation and EPI
The notion that participation is essential to effective EPI is often taken as a given and only 
rarely subjected to critical interrogation. Participation, it is often argued, is necessary on 
democratic grounds so that the views of all necessary stakeholders can be heard and taken 
into account in the policy-making process. From a normative standpoint there are strong 
arguments for and against such a proposition. In favour, participation – both horizontally to 
include relevant sectors and vertically to embrace a range of actors at the sub-national level – 
may realise a stronger and more inclusive policy (Brown et al., 2005: 447). Furthermore, the 
degradation of the forest resource base is often a consequence of local communities losing 
ownership and control over their resources to powerful outside interests, what may be seen 
as a tragedy of open access leading to the undermining of local commons regimes (Ostrom, 
1990).
Realising the long-term conservation of public goods may be undermined when actors 
with an interest solely in maximisation gains from short-term private good exploitation 
are admitted, or can force access to, forest spaces. A participatory integratory process that 
admitted a timber corporation intent on clearfelling a forest rather than managing it sustainably 
would be difficult to justify in terms of environmental norms. Actors from outside the forest 
who seek to profit from forest exploitation often have significant power relative to those 
who seek to conserve forests (for example, Burgess et al., 2011; Campara, 2005; Nygren, 
2000), and admitting the former to a policy process on the basis that this is desirable as 
inclusiveness may negate the efforts of the latter. It is possible that an EPI process generated 
from a process with a strong degree of participation and which exhibits a strong degree of 
integration between integrant and integer may degrade the resource base because the EPI 
process has been captured by actors motivated by unscrupulous resource exploitation rather 
than by a conservationist ethic. Often, therefore, tragedies of the commons are a consequence 
of the participation of the powerful (The Ecologist, 1993).
The problem of environmental policy integration under neoliberalism 7
Larger groups tend to have a greater heterogeneity of preferences compared to smaller 
groups and are less likely to agree shared goals (Downs et al., 1996). As Brown et al. (2005: 
448) note,
policy integration has strong potential for conflicts of interest due to the demanding and 
multidimensional goals …It certainly cannot be assumed that finding win-win solutions 
can always be realized and any conflicts between different goals can be resolved to the 
satisfaction of all relevant interests.
So the more socially differentiated the actors in, or contesting, a policy system the more 
complex the mix of interests and values and, therefore, the less likely it is that participation 
will generate shared agreement on outcomes. If the intention of EPI is to achieve 
environmental conservationist objectives – and that surely must be the primary basis for 
judging the success or otherwise of EPI as a normative endeavour – than the challenge would 
seem be to ensure that the policy process is expanded to admit all actors who have a vested 
interest in conservationist norms, while excluding, and limiting the influence, of those actors 
whose actions would degrade the resource base. In principle, therefore, effective EPI may run 
counter to the inclusive ethos of participation.
Against this it might be argued that admitting into a policy system actors who are not 
motivated by environmental values will subject them to a process of normative socialisation 
that, over time, will generate behavioural change as the laggards adopt the shared norms of 
the group. On this view, participation can enable the transmission of desirable norms between 
actors. There is considerable evidence that normative socialisation can take place in the forest 
and timber sectors, with many businesses prepared to adjust to the requirements of well-
managed, or sustainably managed, forests. The case of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) 
is illustrative: many actors have been prepared to adjust their behaviour in line with the FSC’s 
principles (Cashore et al., 2004; Gulbrandsen, 2004).
However, from an environmental standpoint, normative socialisation need not 
necessarily be positive. Participation and policy integration may inject a range of different 
values and ideological principles into policy making, not all of them desirable. There is a risk 
that admitting actors who do not share the norms of the group can dilute, or contaminate, 
those norms. If in any integrated process the preferences of all actors are treated the same 
without discrimination, then admitting environmentally unscrupulous actors will result in 
suboptimal outcomes. Much depends on whether participation carries with it the opportunity 
to qualitatively shape the norms and standards of the group. Again the case of the FSC is 
illustrative: while the FSC is prepared to admit any actor that declares its support for the goal 
of improving forest management, it is not prepared to negotiate on its standards. While the 
FSC recognises the merits of participation, it is not driven by any notion of integrating the 
preferences of all comers; it is first and foremost a normative organisation, and its standards 
are not negotiable.
This suggests that full participation is not necessarily desirable: participation should be 
selective and there should be criteria for inclusion. Participation is a means-based objective, 
while environmental conservation is judged in terms of ends. Strong and enforceable policies 
for the environment are more desirable than an holistically integrated or fully participatory 
process in which actors with a stake in environmental degradation are represented.
The principle of participation is now a central one throughout the United Nations system. 
For example, the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) has sought to promote participation 
and to ensure that the voices of more affected parties are heard in multistakeholder dialogue 
segments when the UNFF meets. Consistent with UN accreditation procedures, eight ‘major 
groups’ have been admitted to these dialogues: business and industry, children and youth, 
farmers and small land owners, indigenous peoples, NGOs, science and technological 
communities, women, and workers and trade unions. However, multistakeholder dialogues 
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have had mixed results in integrating environmental norms into the UNFF. First, the 
dialogues admit a range of actors with interests in forest conservation and use, placing 
business and industry on an equal status alongside indigenous peoples. No distinction has 
been made between actors that may play a role in exploiting the resource unsustainably 
and those that wish to conserve it. The response of some indigenous people has been that 
the allocation of their rights should be seen as higher than mere equality with business and 
industry (Humphreys, 2006). Second, there is no mechanism by which the outcomes of 
multistakeholder segments can feed into UNFF mainstream decision making. As a policy 
integration mechanism multistakeholder dialogues are, it may be concluded, flawed in both 
conception and execution.
Policy integration is also an approach that finds support throughout the UN system, 
appearing in soft law and policy guidelines adopted since the 1992 United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED). To give just two examples on forests: in 1997 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests recommended that ‘National forest programmes 
should be implemented in the context of each country’s socio-economic, cultural, political 
and environmental situation, and should be integrated into wider programmes for sustainable 
land use’ (United Nations, 1997: para. 8). Ten years later, the Non-Legally Binding 
Instrument on All Types of Forests of 2007 (which in 2015 was renamed the United Nations 
Forest Instrument) stressed the need to ‘implement measures to enhance cooperation and 
crosssectoral policy and programme coordination among sectors affecting and affected by 
forest policies and management, with a view to integrating the forest sector into national 
decision-making processes and promoting sustainable forest management’ (United Nations, 
2007: para. 6(k)).
However, such mentions in UN declarations are rarely accompanied by any elaboration 
on how integration should take place. Integration is essentially an aspirational goal.
This section has suggested that there is no basis in policy theory or practice for concluding 
that a broad process of inclusive participation will necessarily generate environmentally 
desirable outcomes. It may do, but this should not be an a priori assumption. This argument 
is returned to in the next section, again using international forest policy as an example.
EPI, international forest policy and neoliberalism
Integers, it has been suggested, occur at a variety of spatial scales, ranging from the local 
level, through national policy, to the global level. An integer is guided by a normative vector, 
namely the dominant normative direction of travel of the policies of the integer.
So far the focus of the paper has been on the process of EPI. The argument has assumed that 
there are pre-existing environmental policy integrants which policy makers seek to integrate 
throughout a broader integer. In this section, we shall take a step backwards and consider the 
broader influences that have a bearing upon the environmental policy formulation process. 
Here, an important analytical question is whether, and if so to what extent, the normative 
vector of the integer contributes to environmental policy formulation before EPI.
In order to pursue this question, the focus of this section will be on policy in the broadest 
possible sense, namely the overall normative vector of global governance. One of the main 
factors that shape the normative vector of an integer is the law, and in particular the rights 
that the law upholds. Global governance is guided by international law, which falls into 
three main corpora: human rights, the global economy and the environment. Of these the 
most influential in normative terms is international economic law on trade, investment and 
intellectual property rights.
There is a growing literature which argues that the global economy and environmental 
governance are now dominated, and have been since the mid-1980s, by neoliberalism 
(Colás, 2005; Crouch, 2011; Harvey, 2005; Himley, 2008; Mirowski, 2013; Toke, 2000). 
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Neoliberalism, which aims to protect the rights of capital and investors, is the dominant 
policy discourse of our age, emphasising market-based solutions, an enhanced role for the 
private sector, a reduced role for public sector legislation and regulation and an emphasis on 
voluntary initiatives. The term discourse is used here in a Foucauldian sense as a more or 
less coherent set of ideas and understandings that shape and structure how people think about 
and interpret the world (Foucault, 1994). The discourse of neoliberalism may be seen as the 
dominant normative vector in global governance, in that most policies are, to greater or lesser 
degrees, influenced by it.
This raises an interesting but important analytical puzzle which can be expressed thus: 
if the intention of EPI is to integrate an integrant of environmental policies and values into 
a broader integer which, it is intended, should then be reoriented in line with environmental 
norms then at what point in this process does neoliberalism first have an impact? Two 
theoretical possibilities may be posited. The first is that neoliberal norms do not influence the 
initial stages of environmental policy formulation. On this view, the initial integrant is pure 
environmental policy, unmediated by other norms and values, with neoliberal norms interacting 
with environmental policy only during the process of integration, perhaps when policy makers 
negotiate the implementation of the policy. The second possibility is that neoliberal norms 
influence and shape environmental policy before it is integrated throughout the broader integer.
The first, while possible in principle, would require policy makers to make environmental 
policy in a vacuum, paying no attention at all to the broader policy context. This seems 
unlikely, suggesting that the second is the more likely possibility. Indeed, the empirical 
evidence supports this. For example, the UN Forest Instrument on forests contains provisions 
to ‘encourage private sector investment’ and to ‘create an enabling environment for forest 
investment’ (United Nations, 2007: para. 6(h) and para. 6(n)). The same instrument also 
mentions ‘promoting international trade from sustainably managed forests’ (para. 6(g)) and 
‘voluntary instruments, such as voluntary certification systems’ (para. 6(x)). So while the 
purpose of the UNFF and its predecessors is to agree international forest policy, neoliberal 
principles appear during the negotiation process. States seeking to implement, say, the UN 
Forest Instrument, into national forest policy will not be implementing pure forest policy but 
what we may call neoliberal forest policy.
Those who see neoliberalism as the most significant contemporary normative force in 
environmental politics argue that environmental policy is routinely shaped by neoliberal 
policy principles, establishing the parameters to what is admissible in environmental policy. 
The result is the neoliberalising (Castree, 2008a, 2008b) or, alternatively, the neoliberalisation 
(Heynen and Robbins, 2005; Himley, 2008; Humphreys, 2009; McCarthy and Prudham, 
2004) of nature. Given that a major ideational driving force of environmental degradation 
is neoliberalism, which legitimises the often unregulated activities of businesses in forest 
spaces, the neoliberalisation of environmental policy is deeply problematic. If environmental 
policy has itself been shaped ab initio by the very same ideational forces that give rise to 
environmental degradation then EPI, it can be argued, is inevitably destined to fail. In other 
words, if neoliberalism has already set the parameters for environmental policy, delimiting it 
prior to integration, then even the most effective EPI process will be fatally weakened as it 
will have been deprived from the outset of any transformatory potential.
Such a process, it may be argued, has occurred in international forest policy, with the 
emphasis on voluntary, non-binding, private sector and market-led responses to deforestation. 
If EPI is an example of the integration of an environmental policy integrant into an integer, 
the expression of neoliberal principles in international forest policy illustrates how the 
principles of the neoliberal integer shape, and thereby weaken, the normative intent of the 
integrant prior to integration. In such cases, the scope for effective EPI leading to a change in 
the normative vector of the integer are, inevitably, severely limited.
10 D Humphreys
The problem of normative incongruence between neoliberalism on the one hand and 
environmental objectives on the other is not even acknowledged as a theoretical possibility in 
international environmental negotiations, still less addressed. For example, international forest 
negotiations have concentrated on crafting compromise language that covers up normative 
and political conflicts. International soft law on the environment, such as the UN Forest 
Instrument, has emerged as a hybrid of neoliberal policy principles and other discourses 
on the conservation and sustainable management of forests. Ideas become more powerful 
as organising principles the more spaces they occupy and influence, and neoliberalism has 
achieved its dominant role in global governance by shaping and guiding policy formulation 
in many different political spaces.
It is here that participatory processes may be problematic. The more participatory a 
policy formulation process is, the more likely it is that powerful political and economic 
actors that support neoliberal policy principles will be admitted to the policy process and be 
able to shape the integrant according to neoliberal principles. Indeed, neoliberalism has been 
systematically promoted by powerful proponents such as developed world governments, 
transnational corporations and investment banks. As a result, it has found expression within 
a broad range of environmental policies. For example, forest-related policy outputs routinely 
mention the needs for private investment, market-based solutions (such as carbon trading and 
certification) and voluntary measures to address the international trade in illegally logged 
timber (Giessen, 2013; Humphreys, 2011).
This suggests a need to consider the role of neoliberalism in shaping both the broad 
structures of global governance in general and environmental policy in particular. Neoliberal 
principles are omnipresent throughout global governance but arguably the loci of neoliberal 
power in global governance are the international financial and trade organisations: the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Peet, 
2003). Of these the WTO is the most important. Stephen Gill (1998) argues that the WTO 
promotes a ‘new constitutionalism’ that upholds the rights of investors and business. The 
WTO promotes investment liberalisation (the right of an investor in one country to invest in 
any other) and trade liberalisation (the right of a business in any one country to trade with any 
other). A range of international agreements on international trade, investment and intellectual 
property rights have now been consolidated under the auspices of the WTO. To Gill, this is 
akin to a global constitution, but unlike national level constitutions, which specify the rights 
and liberties of people, the WTO codifies investors and business rights. Alston (2002) argues 
that ‘any such rights arising out of WTO agreements are not, and should not be considered to 
be, analogous to human rights’. They are first and foremost the rights of private corporations 
and investors.
The WTO has a stronger normative force in shaping the behaviour of states and businesses 
than international environmental law as it has tougher enforcement provisions. States have 
given the WTO the authority to require changes to national law consistent with WTO rules 
on pain of sanctions. Few international environmental agreements (the Montreal Protocol is 
one example) have such strong provisions. The WTO also has procedures for resolving any 
disputes over the interpretation of any conflicts that may arise between WTO agreements.
Integrating environmental standards into the WTO has achieved modest success. In 
the context of the WTO environmental standards have tended to be viewed as barriers to 
trade although the WTO does permit trade-related measures to protect the environment that 
meet the WTO principle of non-discrimination between states and apply equally to all states 
(Shaffer, 2001). However, the WTO does not permit states to discriminate between goods on 
the basis of their manufacture; so no state can decide to import, say, sustainably managed 
timber (however defined) but prohibit the import of unsustainably managed timber. The 
strength of the WTO in relation to environmental law forms what Gill (1995, 2002) views as 
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an example of the ascendancy of the rights of businesses and investors over human rights or 
the right to a clean environment. To one international lawyer (Tarasofsky, 2005), the WTO 
‘is perhaps the strongest inter-State judicial dispute settlement mechanism in existence’. All 
significant international instruments on trade, investment and international property rights 
have been consolidated under the auspices of the WTO. In distinction, responsibility for 
implementing international environmental law is scattered over many organisation.
Overall EPI at the international level has had limited success. Actors promoting EPI may 
encounter structural resistance to environmental objectives from actors that have a vested 
interest in retaining the status quo (Briassoulis, 2005a, 2005b). Environmental policies have 
been integrated into one of neoliberalism’s main international institutions, the WTO, to 
only a limited degree. Meanwhile principles that the WTO espouses such as the promotion 
of trade and liberalisation of international investment flows have penetrated international 
environmental policy. The neoliberalisation of trade and investment is the WTO’s normative 
vector, not environmental conservation, and relying on the WTO to promote environmental 
conservation cannot succeed without fundamental changes to global governance. This 
suggests that achieving robust and effective international environmental policies cannot be 
achieved by integrating environmental policy integrants into a neoliberal integer. Instead, the 
emphasis should be on integral change.
Environmental policy and global economic governance: Towards integral change
Integers establish the context within which attempts at EPI must take place. They are 
simultaneously the targets of EPI and the constraints with which EPI must grapple. In the 
context of global governance, neoliberal integers set the limits of environmental policies, 
admitting only those that are congruent with neoliberal principles and filtering out the 
rest. In such a context, effective environmental policies that arrest the structural causes of 
environmental degradation at source are unlikely as they would challenge the interests of the 
powerful economic and political actors that promote the ideology of neoliberalism. On this 
view, because EPI cannot achieve little more than marginal and incremental environmental 
gains what is needed is integral change, that is a fundamental shift of the normative vector of 
global governance away from neoliberalism.
The rights that are most important to neoliberalism include rights to property (including 
intellectual property), the right to invest and the right to free international trade. The main 
challenge to neoliberalism is international environmental law, namely that body of law that 
aims to regulate the relationship between humanity and nature. Although there is no explicit 
recognition of a human right to a clean environment in international law it can be argued 
that the growing body of international and European Union environmental law constitutes 
a de facto recognition that humans have environmental rights to a sustainable environment 
(Fitzmaurice and Marshall, 2007). Much international law promotes instrumental values, 
seeking to conserve the environment for human use, although some legal instruments mention 
intrinsic values, in particular the Convention on Biological Diversity (United Nations, 1992).
One proposal for strengthening international environmental law is to create a new 
organisation of similar stature to the WTO – a World Environmental Organization (WEO) – 
responsible for handling all international environmental instruments (Bauer and Biermann, 
2005; Biermann, 2000, 2002; Oberthür and Gehring, 2004). Amongst the arguments 
put forward for a WEO are the following. A WEO could coordinate and rationalise the 
disparate international institutions that handle environmental issues, eliminating areas of 
duplication and addressing gaps in international environmental governance whereby discrete 
environmental issues are governed by separate international environmental agreements, thus 
ignoring the complex interdependences within ecosystems and between ecosystems and 
society. A WEO could function as a coordinating body streamlining the activities of different 
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international legal agreements and exploiting the synergies between them. By speaking with 
a single clear voice on environmental issues, a WEO could promote environmental standards 
in global governance. If it had sufficient implementation capacity to enforce its decisions, a 
WEO could help to provide a new normative vector for global governance, one founded on 
environmental rather than neoliberal norms.
Against this it can be argued that a WEO that dealt solely with environmental issues 
and which had no broader mandate on global economic issues would represent only a 
modest institutional balancing act. The result could be a more sharply polarised model of 
global governance in which two major international institutions – WTO and WEO – vie for 
supremacy. At present, international legal instruments coming under the auspices of the WTO 
have greater normative force in international law than environmental instruments, and it is not 
clear that creating a WEO would resolve this problem. Leaving the WTO with responsibility 
for international trade and investment law while creating a WEO with responsibility for 
international environmental law would not solve the problem, merely recast it.
If the coexistence of a WTO and WEO is undesirable, then a theoretical possibility, based 
on the logic that a fundamental reorientation of global governance is necessary, is to abandon 
the WTO and create a WEO. The WEO would then assume responsibility for international 
law on trade and investment as well as on the environment. International trade could be 
permitted if, and only if, it did not generate adverse environmental impacts. The burden 
would be placed on those who wish to trade to demonstrate that their products met agreed 
criteria of sustainability. Agreeing a reformed global governance in which environmental 
norms prevail over economic norms may be the most desirable option for integral change 
in global governance; but given how trade and investment liberalisation have dominated the 
post-war global economy it is, at least at present, unfeasible. Certainly there is no political 
will amongst states and businesses to abolish the WTO, although as a strategy this is favoured 
by some environmental and social campaigners (Wallach and Woodall, 2004).
Conclusions
It has been argued that EPI may be imagined as the integration of environmental policy 
integrants into broader integers. The intent of EPI is that it will mainstream environmental 
norms throughout policy systems, reorienting the normative vectors of policy integers, with 
other policies admitted only to the extent that they do not result in environmental degradation. 
However, the experience of EPI as a strategy is that while it may rid mainstream policy-
making systems of their worst excesses it has had limited success in shifting the normative 
vector of policy integers.
This paper has urged that caution be exercised with respect to the received wisdom that 
EPI requires strong participation. From an environmental perspective, the quest for a model 
with a strong degree of integration based on broad participation across different sectors may 
admit actors with an interest in unsustainable resource exploitation. The participation of an 
heterogeneous mix of actors with widely differing values and interests policy preferences 
may render the process of forging collectively agreed integrated responses more difficult. 
Indeed the main reason why environmental policy is often framed as one of policy integration 
is because the traditional mode of policy making of ministries and sectoral-based institutions 
is not flexible enough to respond to the intersectoral attributes of environmental problems. In 
this respect, the problem of environmental policy is in large part the process of policy making 
itself. In particular, the role of neoliberal values in shaping environmental policy integrants 
prior to attempts at integration fundamentally weakens the transformational potential of EPI.
If EPI is to play an active role in environmental conservation then, rather than 
negotiate and compromise with other sectors and actors whose activities lead to environmental 
degradation, it must seek to limit their autonomy. It must establish the parameters of action, 
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prescribing those actions and behaviours that are desirable from an environmental 
conservation standpoint and proscribing those that are not. This would generate a fundamental 
re-orientation of policy making with integers defined by environmental norms, and integrants 
admitted only to the extent that they are congruent with those norms. However, how this can 
be achieved is no easy task, challenging, as it would, some of the world’s most powerful 
businesses and governments.
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